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C 
RESPONSE 
THE EMPTY PROMISE OF COMPASSIONATE 
CONSERVATISM: A REPLY TO JUDGE WILKINSON 
 
William P. Marshall* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ONSERVATIVE jurisprudence is in the midst of an identity 
crisis. After having been relegated to the sidelines during the 
Warren and early Burger Court eras, conservative jurists have so- 
lidified their control of the federal courts. In exercising this new- 
found power, however, conservatives have faced significant chal- 
lenges created by their dominance. They have learned the 
agonizing lesson that it is far easier to criticize from the outside 
than it is to rule. Doctrines and principles that can be purely es- 
poused when one is out of power are harder to maintain after one 
takes the reins of control. 
Adhering to long-standing doctrines and principles is particu- 
larly troublesome when those tenets limit the authority of those in 
control. Doctrines and principles are far less attractive when they 
serve to limit one’s own authority than when they limit the power 
of one’s ideological opponents. This dilemma has been particularly 
problematic for conservatives because for many years the center- 
piece of their jurisprudential agenda was the call for judicial re- 
straint. Conservatives consistently condemned as judicial activism 
judicial  decisions  that  overturned  the  actions  of  elected  officials.1 
Greater deference to popularly enacted provisions, conservatives 
claimed, was necessary to the rule of law.2 
Things have changed. The conservatives’ internal conflict be- 
tween exercising their judicial dominance and adhering to tenets 
 
 
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I would like to thank Er- 
win Chemerinsky, Gene Nichol, Lou Bilionis, Eric Muller, and Ward Farnsworth for 
their thoughts and comments. I am also deeply indebted to Heather M. Hammond for 
her research assistance. 
1 Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 326 (1996); Richard 
Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 207–08, 211 (1985). 
2 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 646–47 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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that would constrain their use of judicial power has been resolved 
in favor of the former. Conservatives now freely justify judicial in- 
validations  of  popularly  enacted  legislative  provisions,3  and  they 
express little discomfort about the legitimacy of other forms of ac- 
tivism  as  well.4  The actual effects of this less restrained conserva- 
tism are apparent. Conservative majorities on the United States 
Supreme Court have been striking down federal legislation in an 
unprecedented number of cases5 and overturning, or undermining, 
countless disfavored precedents.6 
Defending a more activist judicial agenda, however, is only part 
of the conservatives’ challenge. The other part is developing the 
justifications in support of that agenda.  After  all, if both liberals 
and conservatives are engaging in activism, the question must be 
asked: Why is a conservative judicial agenda more attractive than a 
liberal one? 
It is precisely this question that is addressed by Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III in his eloquent essay, “Why Conservative Jurispru- 
dence Is Compassionate.”7 Judge Wilkinson’s project is to defend 
conservative jurisprudence against a claim that he believes unfairly 
derogates its normative attractiveness—specifically, that conserva- 
tive jurisprudence lacks compassion.8 Accordingly, he takes on the 
purported misperception that liberal jurisprudence is  compassion- 
ate while conservative jurisprudence is not. To Judge Wilkinson, 
conservative jurisprudence, properly understood, can “more than 
 
 
3 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There A Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 
73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1383, 1385–89 (2002) (defending the Court’s federalism decisions 
striking down congressional enactments). 
4 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Con- 
gress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535, 1545 
(2000) (arguing that courts need not defer to stare decisis). 
5 See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80, 85 
(2001) (exploring methodologies employed by the Rehnquist Court that “have re- 
sulted in a growing disrespect for Congress” by invalidating federal legislation); Seth 
P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (2001) (pointing out that 
the Rehnquist Court has invalidated twenty-six different federal enactments since 
1995). 
6 See William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1217, 1232–36 (2002) and cases cited therein. 
7 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassionate, 89 
Va. L. Rev. 753 (2003). 
8 Judge Wilkinson defines compassion as “the extension of empathy, kindness, and 
concern for one’s fellow human beings.” Id. at 753. 
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hold [its] own” against its liberal counterpart in the compassion 
debate.9 
Judge Wilkinson is both an accomplished jurist and one of the 
nation’s leading legal scholars, and his defense of judicial conserva- 
tism will deservedly be influential.10 His account of judicial conser- 
vatism is thoughtful and compelling and provides important and 
considerable insights into conservative legal thought. It is also im- 
mensely provocative in that it seeks to defend conservative juris- 
prudence on grounds not normally associated with conservatism.11 
As this Essay will suggest, however, Judge Wilkinson’s thesis is, in 
the end, unpersuasive. Contemporary conservative jurisprudence is 
not the dispassionate system of legal decisionmaking he describes. 
Rather, it is a system that consistently reinforces the rights and 
prerogatives of entrenched interests while minimizing the protec- 
tions accorded marginalized and disaffected groups. The compas- 
sion in such jurisprudence is difficult to discern. 
 
I. THE DEFENSE OF CONSERVATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AS 
COMPASSIONATE 
Judge Wilkinson begins his essay by targeting the caricature that 
liberal jurisprudence protects deserving individuals and is therefore 
 
 
9 Id. 
10 Indeed, Judge Wilkinson’s essay was cited and discussed even before publication. 
See, e.g., George F. Will, One Judge’s Conservatism, Newsweek, Mar. 3, 2003, at 68, 
68 (“When next there is a Supreme Court vacancy, Wilkinson’s measured jurispru- 
dence might make him the ideal nominee to silence those whose arguments against 
judicial conservatism range from the unpersuasive to the offensive.”). 
11 Despite its academic tenor, however, “Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Com- 
passionate” is also politically charged. At present, the national debate over judicial 
nominations has reached new levels of acrimony in anticipation of potential Supreme 
Court retirements and in the ongoing controversies over  whether  Bush  Administra- 
tion nominees to the lower courts are too conservative. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Polar- 
ized Politics, Confirmation Chaos: Retribution  Appears  Evident in Nominations  
Since the Late 1980s, Wash. Post, May 11, 2003, at A5. Judge Wilkinson’s description 
of judicial conservatism as “compassionate” injects him directly into this controversy. 
“Compassionate conservatism” has been the catchphrase used by the President to de- 
scribe and engender support for his domestic policies. See, e.g., Press Release, The 
White House, Fact Sheet: Compassionate Conservatism (Apr. 30, 2002), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/print/20020430.html (on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association). Any defense of a compassionate, conservative 
jurisprudence must therefore be seen as a defense of the Bush Administration’s judi- 
cial nominations agenda. 
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humane, while conservative jurisprudence protects big business 
and government and rigidly adheres to bright-line rules in the face 
of sympathetic circumstances and is therefore callous and unfeel- 
ing.12 Such a caricature, as Judge Wilkinson notes, is certainly not 
as  descriptively  accurate  as  it  might  pretend,13  but  he  is  less  con- 
cerned with attacking the accuracy of the stereotype than he is with 
unpacking its normative assumptions. Accordingly, he attempts to 
show how a liberal jurisprudence that favors individuals “ap- 
pear[ing] at the courthouse doors armed with poignant circum- 
stances” is not necessarily as humane as it would like to believe.14 
On the other side, a conservative jurisprudence that rejects such 
claims in deference to sharper rules of law, and to the interests of 
collective entities such as business or government, is not as callous 
as has been charged.15 
Judge Wilkinson raises three interrelated arguments in support 
of this proposition. First, he contends that relying on compassion 
alone as a tool for deciding cases is not appropriate for judicial ac- 
tion.16 Reason and an understanding of consequences must attend 
judicial decisionmaking no matter how that decisionmaking may be 
informed by sympathy; otherwise, decisions based on compassion 
may end up “hurting the very people one’s compassion is intended 
to help.”17 Second, favoring the individual over the collective is not 
always compassionate. There are individuals in the collective as 
well, Judge Wilkinson reminds us, and advancing the interests of 
one individual over the interests of others might create its own set 
of harms.18 For this reason, compassion in judicial decisionmaking 
can be a double-edged sword. Judge Wilkinson asserts that com- 
passion exists, for example, on both sides of products liability cases 
and criminal prosecutions. Excessive plaintiffs’ awards can “drive 
up prices and keep needed products off the market,”19 while freeing 
criminal defendants tends to exact its greatest costs on minorities 
 
 
12 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 754–57. 
13 Id. at 757 (citing Charles Fried & Ronald Dworkin, ‘A Badly Flawed Election’:    
An Exchange, N.Y. Rev. Books, Feb. 22, 2001, at 8). 
14 Id. at 756. 
15 Id. at 766–67. 
16 Id. at 761–63. 
17 Id. at 764. 
18 Id. at 766–67. 
19 Id. at 768. 
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and the poor because “victims of crime are disproportionately the 
most  vulnerable  members  of  society.”20  Third,  although  offered 
more tentatively, Judge Wilkinson argues in favor of conservative 
jurisprudence’s  predilection  toward  bright-line  rules.21  Bright-line 
rules, he asserts, “embod[y] the virtues of advance notice, uniform 
and consistent treatment, and respect for whatever democratic 
process  may  have  brought  the  rule  about.”22  They  are  therefore 
preferable to the liberals’ purported tendency to bend rules in a 
system of judicial “exceptionalism” designed to accommodate a 
particularly  deserving  litigant’s  special  circumstances.23  Recogniz- 
ing that adherence to bright-line rules may be a matter of degree, 
however, Judge Wilkinson is quick to assure that bright-line rules 
should not “carry the day in each and every circumstance.”24 
Judge Wilkinson’s arguments obviously hold some resonance. 
Clearly a jurisprudence based solely upon sympathy for those in 
plight would not be much of a jurisprudence.25 Similarly, his posi- 
tion is sound in that when determining the most compassionate 
course of action, the interests of collective entities as well as indi- 
vidual litigants must be considered:26  The concern for compassion 
can be on both sides of particular issues.27 Finally, there is merit in 
 
 
 
20 Id. at 769. 
21 Id. at 760–61. 
22 Id. at 760. 
23 See id. at 760–61. 
24 Id. at 761. 
25 Although, interestingly enough, an entire judicial system (equity) was built upon 
the need to mitigate the harshness of rigid rules of law on particular litigants. See, e.g., 
J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 106 (4th ed. 2002) (“‘The office 
of the chancellor is to correct men’s consciences for frauds, breaches of trust, wrongs 
and oppressions of what nature soever they be, and to soften and mollify the extrem- 
ity of the law.’” (quoting Earl of Oxford’s Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (1615))). 
26 Protecting the individual litigant, however, may also provide benefit to those who, 
although represented in the collective entity in the suit against that particular plaintiff, 
may on another day be injured litigants themselves. 
27 Of  course,  just  because  compassion  can  be on both  sides of  an  issue  does   not 
mean that it is equally apportioned. Consider for a moment the products liability ex- 
ample raised by Judge Wilkinson. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 767–68. Tort rules that 
promote cost sharing, for example, are designed to maximize compassion by assuring 
that those most grievously affected by a particular action obtain relief in a manner 
that only marginally affects those who incur compensation expenses. Moreover, while 
it is true that excessive damages may have harmful effects, it is also true that the fear 
of those damages has made our society one of the safest in the world. In that sense, 
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his defense of bright-line rules and his recognition that such rules 
have their limitations.28 
Nevertheless, even if one recognizes the validity of these argu- 
ments, they still fall short of the goal of defending contemporary 
conservative jurisprudence as compassionate. To begin with, they 
suggest at most that individualized compassion may be an ill-fitting 
foundation for a system of justice because it is jurisprudentially 
limited and does not foresee adverse consequences. That is, it cre- 
ates a jurisprudence of “exceptionalism” and does not recognize 
that compassion can often be implicated on both sides of disputes. 
These are, however, essentially negative points about the pur- 
ported over-use of compassion in liberal jurisprudence; they are 
not positive propositions suggesting that conservatism has its own 
unique vision or understanding of compassion.29 
More importantly, however, as discussed in Part II of this Essay, 
Judge Wilkinson’s attempt to defend conservative jurisprudence is 
misplaced because the conservatism he describes is not contempo- 
rary conservative jurisprudence. The judicial conservatism that is at 
the center of the current political debates over judicial nominations 
and the “polarization” of legal culture that Judge Wilkinson rightly 
 
 
 
the compassion underlying tort law has worked to the advantage of both individual 
plaintiffs and society as a whole. 
28 Judge Wilkinson’s apparent approval of recidivist sentencing statutes, see id. at 
759–60, however, might give one pause as to whether he believes compassion is at all 
relevant to the question of when bright-line rules should  be  abandoned.  This  past 
Term in Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003), for example, the Court upheld 
two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison under California’s “three 
strikes” law for a defendant who, on two separate occasions, stole five and four video- 
tapes respectively. Id. at 1169–70, 1175–76. The defendant had previously been con- 
victed of three counts of first degree burglary, so each of the videotape theft convic- 
tions triggered a separate application of the three strikes law. Id. at 1170–71. Judge 
Wilkinson might respond that the “compassion” in this result is either in its deference   
to majoritarian action or in its concern for crime  victims,  but neither response would  
be satisfactory. The former suggests that majoritarian action should be deferred to 
reflexively solely because it is majoritarian action—a position Wilkinson himself ap- 
pears to reject in another writing. See Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 1388–89, 1399. The 
latter suggests that given the harshness of the penalty in relation to the  minimal inju- 
ries inflicted on the victims, the meaning of compassion has very little content. 
29 Significantly, Judge Wilkinson does not offer a paradigmatic case or example that 
reflects a uniquely conservative vision of compassion. Rather, virtually all of the ex- 
amples he uses are aimed at showing that compassion is not always solely on the side 
of the individual litigant. 
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decries30  is  the  dominant  contemporary  jurisprudence  of  the  Jus- 
tices on the conservative wing of the Supreme Court. These are the 
Justices whom the President has declared the models for his judi- 
cial appointments and for his compassionate conservative agenda31 
and whom Judge Wilkinson himself cites as examples of conserva- 
tive thought.32 The meaning of compassionate conservative juris- 
prudence, accordingly, can only be understood with the jurispru- 
dence of these Justices in mind. As Part II demonstrates, however, 
contemporary conservative jurisprudence does not comport with 
the account of conservatism offered by Judge Wilkinson. In fact, in 
order to achieve desired results, conservative Justices have relied 
upon exactly the type of untethered compassion that Judge Wilkin- 
son  condemns  as  illegitimate.33  Accordingly,  if  Judge  Wilkinson’s 
effort is an attempt to defend the Court’s conservative jurispru- 
dence and/or the judicial agenda of the current Administration, it 
assuredly fails. 
Finally, as discussed in Part III, Judge Wilkinson’s attempt to de- 
fend contemporary conservative thought against liberal attack is mis- 
directed because the dichotomy he describes is not the primary line 
that currently divides the conservative and liberal camps. The division 
is not between a jurisprudence that inappropriately responds to indi- 
vidual poignancies and one that relies on sharp lines and collective 
concerns. (As shown in Part II, both sides can be criticized on this 
count.) Rather, the essential division is between a liberal jurispru- 
dence geared toward protecting the marginalized groups in society 
and a conservative jurisprudence that tends to reinforce the existing 
powers of dominant groups. As Part III demonstrates, conservatives 
have taken their role in protecting entrenched interests quite seri- 
ously. They have expanded the constitutional rights of already power- 
ful interests. They have opposed liberal attempts to increase the con- 
stitutional protections accorded marginalized groups. They have 
invalidated legislative attempts that would reduce the disparities be- 
tween the powerful and the marginalized in the political market- 
 
 
30 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 771. 
31 See, e.g., Dewar, supra note 11 (identifying Justices Scalia and Thomas as models 
for President Bush’s judicial appointment); Press Release, The White House, supra 
note 11 (outlining President Bush’s vision of “compassionate conservatism”). 
32 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 756–57, 757 nn.9–10. 
33 See infra notes 49–79 and accompanying text. 
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place. They have consistently resisted both constitutional and legis- 
lative attempts to increase the access of disadvantaged litigants to 
courts of justice. Accordingly, as the Conclusion suggests, the claim 
that such a jurisprudence is “compassionate” is difficult to sustain. 
 
II. THE SELECTIVELY COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVE 
The image of the conservative judge reluctantly turning away 
poignant litigants because she understands that giving in to sympa- 
thies may be counterproductive or affirmatively harmful is an at- 
tractive one. It is a description, however, that does not capture the 
conservative wing of the Supreme Court. Part of the image is 
true—the conservative wing often turns away sympathetic liti- 
gants.34 Yet it is also true that in other cases the conservative wing 
seems moved by sympathy in the exact way that Judge Wilkinson 
condemns—it is just that the objects of its compassion are more of- 
ten the relatively empowered rather than the dispossessed. 
Property owners, for example, seem to be particular beneficiar- 
ies of the conservatives’ sympathies. In a series of cases, Court con- 
servatives have sided with landowners in sustaining constitutional 
attacks against zoning, environmental protection, and land use re- 
strictions. In so doing, the conservatives have applied the stringent 
standards of review more akin to those found in civil rights or civil 
liberties cases than economic regulation.35 They have also, in these 
cases, moved away from the type of bright-line rules applauded by 
Judge   Wilkinson36   to   a   multifaceted,   case-by-case   inquiry   that 
makes the application of law in this area increasingly unpredict- 
able.37  The  result  of  these  decisions,  naturally,  is  either  to  deter 
 
34 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202– 
03 (1989) (holding that the state’s failure to act to protect a child from abuse does not 
violate the Due Process Clause and stating that although judges are “moved by natu- 
ral sympathy” for a young boy beaten to the point of severe brain damage by his fa- 
ther, it is best to avoid “yielding to that impulse” in determining the liability of the 
Department of Social Services for its role in knowingly leaving the boy in a home with 
a long history of physical abuse). 
35 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). The majority held that the Coastal Commission’s decision to condition a 
permit for property renovations on the landowners’ agreement to allow a public 
easement across their beach constituted a taking. Id. at 841–42. 
36 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 760. 
37 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1418 (2003) (describing 
regulatory takings jurisprudence as characterized by “‘essentially ad hoc, factual in- 
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such restrictions or force communities enacting them to risk incur- 
ring high damage awards, including attorneys’ fees.38 
Like the injured plaintiffs in products liability cases discussed by 
Judge  Wilkinson,39  the property owners in the takings cases often 
present sympathetic circumstances.40 It is therefore illuminating to 
compare the products liability and takings cases under Judge Wil- 
kinson’s framework. Judge Wilkinson argues that we should ques- 
tion whether sustaining such large awards for individual plaintiffs 
in products cases is truly compassionate because jury awards may 
threaten the viability of some enterprises and the availability of 
goods to those who need them the most.41 As he points out, on the 
other side of products litigation are the personalized interests of 
the  nonlitigant  consumers.42  The  same,  however,  can  be  asserted 
with respect to the conservatives’ enforcement of takings claims. 
Inhibiting  community  efforts  to  improve  flood  drainage,43  to  pro- 
 
quiries’” (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978))); Christopher P. Yates, Reagan Revolution Redux in Takings Clause Juris- 
prudence, 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 531, 532–33, 559–61 (1995) (arguing that the 
Court’s recent shift in takings jurisprudence has decreased land use planners’ ability 
to predict when a contemplated restriction or condition will constitute a compensable 
taking); Tyrone T. Bongard, Comment, Does Palazzolo v. Rhode Island’s Upholding 
of the Transferability of Takings Claims Require a Rethinking of Takings Jurispru- 
dence?, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 392, 393 (2002) (noting the increasing complexity of the tak- 
ings inquiry). 
38 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Court made defending against 
takings claims even more onerous when it imposed an additional barrier to land use 
restrictions by “abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and im- 
posing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid compre- 
hensive land use plan.” Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The city of Tigard condi- 
tioned the Dolans’ commercial development permit, in part, on dedication of a strip 
of their land to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway, which was to help offset a 
projected increase in traffic as a result of the development. Id. at 377–78. The majority 
conceded that generally a party challenging a land use regulation carries the burden 
to prove it arbitrary. Id. at 391 n.8. Nevertheless, the Court held that the burden 
rested with the city to demonstrate with quantifiable findings that the path would, or 
was likely to, reduce traffic. Id. at 395–96. 
39 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 767–69. 
40 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992), for ex- 
ample, the landowner purchased oceanfront property for $975,000 in order to build 
single-family homes. Subsequently enacted anti-erosion legislation, however, prohib- 
ited home construction on the property, virtually eliminating its commercial value. Id. 
at 1007. 
41 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 767–69. 
42 Id. at 768–69. 
43 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 378–79. 
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mote public access to natural resources,44 to combat erosion,45 or to 
preserve  threatened  wetlands46  also  inflicts  personalized  injury  on 
the members of the collective community. Indeed the effects on 
collective interests may be more egregious than those caused by 
the random products liability case because natural resources are 
unique and finite. It is one thing, for example, for a potentially 
dangerous product to never reach the market; it is another for a 
natural resource to be lost forever. 
A similar point can be made in contrasting the conservatives’ 
takings jurisprudence with the police brutality cases also discussed 
by Judge Wilkinson. Judge Wilkinson argues that we should be 
cautious about adopting rules imposing liability on the police that 
are  so  harsh  as  to  deter  effective  police  action.47  An  inert  police 
force stilled from acting because of fear of liability is of little assis- 
tance to potential crime victims. Yet this observation also applies 
to town zoning boards and state environmental protection agen- 
cies. Do we want to discourage communities from implementing 
flood control plans, fighting erosion, or preserving scarce natural 
resources?48 
Perhaps the most telling example  of the  conservatives’  bending 
to their sympathies occurred in Payne v. Tennessee, where a con- 
servative majority held that victim impact testimony was admissi- 
ble in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case.49 To begin with, 
the conservative Justices in Payne immediately made it clear they 
were not going to be bothered by principles of judicial restraint. In 
 
44 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827–29 (1987). 
45 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007–08. 
46 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001). 
47 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 766–67. 
48 The conservative solicitude for property owners, moreover, extends beyond the 
substantive issues present in takings cases—it also extends to the conservatives’ leni- 
ency with respect to property owner litigants’ access to the courts. The leading case on 
this point is Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627, in which the conservative-led majority held 
that a property owner could maintain a takings challenge even if she succeeded to the 
property after the challenged restriction was enacted. This holding is literally an invi- 
tation to wear down the resistance of zoning boards by encouraging strategic behavior 
by those intent on challenging land restrictions. It also stands in stark contrast to the 
conservatives’ opinions in habeas cases where their dominant theme has been to 
minimize litigation challenging the legality of government action. See, e.g., Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1989) (limiting the types of claims that may be raised in 
habeas corpus petitions). 
49 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
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their rush to allow the admission of victim impact testimony, the 
conservatives overturned precedents of only two50 and four years,51 
indicating that “conservative” rules of jurisprudence such as ad- 
herence to stare decisis were not going to serve as a bar to achiev- 
ing  their  desired  result.52  The  purported  conservative  affinity  for 
bright-line rules that would normally prohibit overturning such 
short-lived precedents was nowhere to be found in the conservative 
majority’s opinion. 
Still, it was in the merits of the case where the conservatives 
truly established they could promote the type of emotionally-laden 
judicial jurisprudence so ably criticized by Judge Wilkinson. As 
noted above, the question in Payne was whether victim impact tes- 
timony could be presented to a jury during the sentencing portion 
of capital cases. In Payne itself the evidence sought to be intro- 
duced was the testimony of a child’s grandmother about the effects 
that the murder of the child’s mother and sister had on the three- 
year-old boy.53 The offered testimony was as follows: 
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she 
doesn’t come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes 
to me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do 
you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried 
about my Lacie.54 
To this the state prosecutor added the following: 
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hope- 
fully. . . . And he is going to know what happened to his baby sis- 
ter and his mother. He is going to want to know what type of jus- 
 
 
 
 
50 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810–11 (1989) (holding victim impact evi- 
dence inadmissible). 
51 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502–03 (1987) (holding victim impact evidence 
inadmissible). 
52 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[S]tare decisis . . . ‘is essen- 
tial if case-by-case  judicial decision-making is to be reconciled with the principle of  
the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, 
deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredict- 
able results.’” (citations omitted)). 
53 Id. at 814. 
54 Id. at 814–15. 
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tice was done. He is going to want to know what happened. With 
your verdict, you will provide the answer.55 
Not surprisingly, the defendant in Payne was sentenced to death.56 
The conservatives’ decision in Payne is problematic in a number 
of respects, including that the compassion toward the crime victim 
expressed in Payne is inconsistent with the conservatives’ approach 
in  other  areas.57  The  problems  in  Payne,  however,  run  far  deeper 
than mere inconsistency. What is most troubling about Payne is the 
extent to which it permits the state to use unbridled compassion for 
the victim as part of its death penalty calculus. The inclusion of vic- 
tim impact testimony means the death penalty decision is posed to 
the jury in terms of whether the victim is so deserving as to have 
the death penalty imposed on her behalf. It is not framed in terms 
of the moral culpability of the defendant—the appropriate focus of 
criminal sentencing. As Professor Angela Harris writes, instead of 
focusing on the defendant’s moral culpability, the jury is asked lit- 
erally to act as “the agent of the grieving family.”58 (In Payne itself, 
for example, the prosecutor urged the jury to make the decision 
“for Nicholas.”59) The implication, of course, is that if the jury fails 
to recommend the death penalty, it is has abandoned its duties 
(and sympathies) toward the survivors and the deceased. The mes- 
sage to the jury is clear: “[M]ercy to the guilty is cruelty to the in- 
nocent.”60 
 
55 Id. at 815. 
56 Id. at 816. 
57 As Professor Susan Bandes argues, the conservative Justices had no trouble in- 
voking the merits of compassion towards crime victims in Payne, yet in cases such as 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 191–93 
(1989), in which the state was sued  for repeatedly and knowingly returning a boy  to 
his abusive father until he was beaten into a coma, the conservatives indicated that 
compassion was an invalid ground for decision in civil rights cases. See Susan Bandes, 
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.  361,  362 
(1996). 
58 Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 93. 
59 Id. at 101. 
60 Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States Constitution: An Ef- 
fort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 Geo. L.J. 1691, 1710 (1997) (inter- 
nal quotations omitted). As Professor Angela Harris explains, the focus on victim im- 
pact evidence effectively changes the nature of the criminal trial. The focus of the 
sentencing stage of the trial is no longer the state versus the defendant. Rather, it be- 
comes a trial between the defendant and the victim: “[T]he death penalty is privat- 
ized.” Harris, supra note 58, at 98–99. 
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The non-rational effects of victim impact statements on the sen- 
tencing jury cannot be overstated. Professor Susan Bandes ex- 
plains: 
Victim impact statements evoke not merely sympathy, pity, and 
compassion for the victim, but also a complex set of emotions di- 
rected toward the defendant, including hatred, fear, racial ani- 
mus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated vengeance, and the desire 
to purge collective anger. These emotional reactions have a cru- 
cial common thread: they all deflect the jury from its duty to con- 
sider the individual defendant and his moral culpability.61 
Moreover, as Bandes states, “the problem with victim impact state- 
ments is not that they evoke emotion rather than reason,” but that 
“they evoke unreasoned, unreflective emotion that cannot be 
placed  in  any  usable  perspective.”62  One  would  think,  therefore, 
that under a regime of conservative jurisprudence, victim impact 
statements should be the first type of evidence to be excluded from 
jury consideration. After all, as Judge Wilkinson writes, “[t]he jury 
is supposed to render a verdict on the evidence, not on the basis of 
sympathy or speculation.”63 
One would also think that victim impact testimony should be ex- 
cluded under Judge Wilkinson’s approach because of the harms 
that such testimony causes to the broader collective concerns about 
the role race plays in capital sentencing. As numerous scholars 
have indicated, the predictable result of the admission of victim 
impact testimony is to enhance the role of the victim’s race in capi- 
tal sentencing, thereby increasing the discrimination against minor- 
 
 
61 Bandes, supra note 57, at 395 (citation omitted). 
62 Id. at 401. Bandes concludes that victim impact statements should be suppressed 
because the jury does not need them to be able to consider “each victim’s ‘uniqueness 
as an individual human being.’” Id. at 406 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 823). The jury 
already most likely identifies with the victim. “We feel empathy most easily toward 
those who are like us . . . . The feeling of identification with the victim of a crime often 
comes naturally.” Id. at 399–400; see also José Felipé Anderson, Will the Punishment 
Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of Vic- 
tim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 Rutgers L.J. 367, 402 (1997) 
(“‘The average citizen is not minded to become a killer; nor does he lose much sleep 
over the possibility of being falsely accused of murder, such situations being rare. 
What he is worried about is becoming a victim.’” (quoting Frank G. Carrington, Nei- 
ther Cruel Nor Unusual 20 (1978))). 
63 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 762. 
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ity  defendants  that  is  already  endemic  in  the  system.64  In  this  re- 
spect, Payne must also be read in conjunction with McCleskey v. 
Kemp, the case in which a conservative-led majority held that it 
would not consider statistical evidence demonstrating that the 
death sentence was administered in a racially discriminatory man- 
ner.65 According to the  Court in Kemp, it would not consider evi- 
dence of systemic discrimination because the only issue for review 
was whether discrimination played a role in the sentencing of the 
defendant in  the case at  hand.66  But  why,  in  a  regime  of  compas- 
sionate conservatism, should such evidence not be admissible while 
victim impact statements are? If Judge Wilkinson is right that we 
should be cautious about allowing personalized compassion to af- 
fect the administration of justice, we should at least examine evi- 
dence that indicates that bias or prejudice is systematically having 
an undue influence in a particular area of law. And such evidence 
should certainly cause us to pause before allowing the admission of 
emotionally laden evidence that will inevitably infuse even more 
personalized emotion into the system. The conservatives in the 
death penalty cases, in short, appear to have their compassion ex- 
actly backwards—too much solicitude for the individualized com- 
passion that can overpower dispassionate deliberation in specific 
cases, too little concern for the compassion against racial minorities 
that pervades the system as a whole. 
One other instance that deserves some mention in which sympa- 
thy appears to play a significant role in conservative jurisprudence 
involves the standing inquiry under Article III.67 In this area, con- 
servatives have shown a particular empathy toward white plaintiffs 
challenging legislative provisions benefiting minorities. Most of the 
time, in order for a litigant to have standing under Article III, the 
Court requires a showing that the plaintiff has suffered “injury in 
fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and not “conjectural or 
hypothetical.”68 On this basis the Court has held, for example, that 
black plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge government support of 
 
 
64 Robert P. Mostellar, The Effect of Victim Impact Evidence on the Defense, 8 
Crim. Just. 24, 28 (1993). 
65 481 U.S. 279, 290–91 (1987). 
66 Id. at 292–93. 
67 U.S. Const. art III. 
68 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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racially discriminatory schools on grounds that such government 
support was racially stigmatizing,69 and that citizen plaintiffs could 
not challenge the government’s giving land to a religious institution 
on grounds that it violated their rights under the Establishment 
Clause.70 In both circumstances, the Court found the plaintiffs’ in- 
juries  to  be  too  abstract  to  satisfy  Article  III  requirements.71  In 
Shaw v. Reno, a conservative majority held that white plaintiffs had 
standing  to  challenge  a  purported  race-based  redistricting  plan,72 
although the only seeming harm to the plaintiffs was the psycho- 
logical affront of being forced to vote in a majority-minority dis- 
trict.73 Apparently to the conservatives, the psychological harm suf- 
fered by white plaintiffs was constitutionally cognizable, while 
similar harms to other plaintiffs were not. A similar dichotomy can 
be found in comparing the conservatives’ opinions on white plain- 
tiff standing in affirmative action cases with their decisions con- 
cerning minority standing to challenge other allegedly discrimina- 
tory actions. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena,74 white contractors 
were granted standing to attack a minority set-aside program, al- 
though they did not need to show that in the absence of the pro- 
gram they would have been awarded the government contract.75 In 
non-affirmative action cases, low income and minority plaintiffs 
have been found to lack standing when their claims were equally 
attenuated.76 
 
 
69 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984). 
70 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482–83 (1982). The land was purportedly worth $577,500. See id. at 
468. 
71 Allen, 468 U.S. at 753; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483, 489. 
72 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). 
73 The white plaintiffs could not claim that their right to vote had been inappropri- 
ately diluted because under the conservatives’ explanation of the merits of the case,   
the state could not presume political behavior from race status alone. See Gene R. 
Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 
314 (2002). 
74 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
75 Id. at 211 (“The aggrieved party ‘need not allege that he would have obtained the 
benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing.’” (quoting Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993))). 
76 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (holding that low income plain- 
tiffs did not have standing to challenge allegedly discriminatory zoning restrictions 
unless they could show that in the absence of the those restrictions there would be a 
substantial probability that they would be able to buy or lease property in the com- 
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As shown in Part III, these cases might be explained as examples 
of the conservatives’ categorical preferences for protecting en- 
trenched interests over marginalized groups. For present purposes, 
however, these cases are also examples of the conservatives’ selec- 
tive use of sympathy as the basis for influencing grounds of deci- 
sion. As Professor Gene Nichol notes, the standing inquiry’s em- 
phasis on “injury in fact” requires a court to be able to empathize and  
understand  the  injury  claim  that  is  presented.77  The  standing cases 
thus establish that conservatives are apparently  willing  or  able to 
empathize with white plaintiffs: They are, however, less generous in 
their compassion toward others. There is, of course, an underlying 
consistency in the conservatives’ use of sympathy—in sympathizing 
with property owners and racial majorities, conserva- tives support 
the more economically and politically powerful seg- ments of 
society.78 
Indeed, even the victim impact testimony cases reflect this pat- 
tern, as the inclusion of such testimony is likely to have its greatest 
effect when the victims are from racial majorities and/or higher 
socio-economic classes.79 This pattern is not happenstance. As the 
next Part shows, conservative jurisprudence may be understood as 
systematically serving the interests of the more powerful segments 
of society—often to the detriment of the less advantaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
munity); Albert Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
163, 251 (comparing the difficulty minorities have in challenging racial profiling with 
the relative ease white plaintiffs have in gaining standing in affirmative action cases). 
77 See Nichol, supra note 73, at 326–27. 
78 A notable exception to this trend is Justice Thomas’s impassioned account in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris of the failure of public schools to satisfy the educational 
needs of inner-city black school children. 536 U.S. 639, 681–82 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Zelman addressed the constitutionality of school voucher programs un- 
der the Establishment Clause. Id. at 676. 
79 One study found that “jurors who ‘heard [victim impact evidence] about highly 
respectable . . . victims . . . rated these victims as more likeable, decent, and more 
valuable; felt more compassion for the victims’ family; believed that the emotional 
impact of the murders on survivors was greater; and rated the crime as more seri- 
ous.’” Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence 
in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 306, 318 (2003) (quoting Edith 
Greene et al., Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases: Does the Victim’s Character 
Matter?, 28 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 145, 154 (1998)). 
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III. COMPASSION AND LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE FAULT LINES 
The previous Part demonstrates that conservative jurisprudence, 
like liberal jurisprudence, may be fairly critiqued as relying on the 
type of individualized sympathy for particular litigants that Judge 
Wilkinson condemns in his essay. Part II does not claim, however, 
that conservative jurisprudence is based entirely upon this type of 
decisionmaking. In fact there are many examples that can be of- 
fered in which conservatives have not been moved by individual- 
ized sympathy even when the injuries are to litigants with whom 
the conservatives might  otherwise  be expected  to empathize.80  At 
the same time, it is also incorrect to condemn liberal jurisprudence 
as one that bends to mindless sympathy and compassion every time 
a poignant litigant appears at the courthouse steps.81 While it may 
 
 
80 Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, have steadfastly refused to endorse 
constitutionally mandated relief for business defendants from excessive awards in tort 
litigation. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1526 
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (voting to uphold an award of $145 million in punitive 
damages—where full compensatory damages were $1 million—in favor of an insured 
who brought suit against State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 598–99 (1996) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (voting to uphold a $2 mil- 
lion judgment against BMW for failing to disclose to purchasers that cars sold as new 
had been repainted after damage in shipping). Justices Scalia and Thomas have like- 
wise consistently refused to find constitutional relief for hapless criminal defendants 
faced with draconian penalties in recidivist sentencing cases. See Ewing v. California, 
123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (upholding a 
minimum twenty-five year sentence under California’s “three strikes” law for a de- 
fendant whose triggering offense was stealing three golf clubs); id. at 1191 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (same); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1169, 
1175–76 (2003) (upholding two consecutive twenty-five years to life sentences under 
California’s “three strikes” law where the triggering offenses were stealing $150 worth 
of videotapes). 
81 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (holding a high 
speed police chase resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s decedent did not violate due 
process where the police officer was not acting with purpose to harm the victim); Bur- 
ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (holding due process does not 
protect a Michigan franchisee businessperson with little relationship to Florida from 
having to defend a lawsuit in that state brought by his franchisor). As the Burger King 
dissent argued, there was a “significant element of unfairness” in this decision. Id. at 
487 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976) (holding that federal courts may refuse their “un- 
flagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction in cases properly brought before them and 
abstain from hearing a water rights claim brought by the United States as trustees for 
Indian tribes); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59 (1966) (holding the ex- 
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be true that some “liberal” decisions may be criticized as overly re- 
sponsive  to  the  plights  of  sympathetic  litigants,82  both  liberal  and 
conservative jurisprudence can be better understood as being 
guided by concerns broader than the plights of specific individuals. 
In this respect, it is notable that Judge Wilkinson begins his essay 
with a discussion of Dandridge v. Williams, the 1970 Supreme Court 
case that upheld a state welfare cap of $250 per month per family, re- 
gardless of the size of the family, against an equal protection chal- 
lenge.83  In  his  discussion  of  the  case,  Judge  Wilkinson  refers  to  the 
claim made by the plaintiffs and endorsed by Justice Marshall that the 
state cap should be subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny be- 
cause the welfare cap affected the ability of the family’s children to 
receive basic sustenance.84 The conservative Justices who prevailed in 
the case, however, saw no basis for heightened scrutiny and evaluated 
the cap under a standard of minimum rationality. Judge Wilkinson 
uses the case to contrast the liberal claim that the courts should elimi- 
nate “the disadvantages of which plaintiffs complained” against the 
conservative position that the Constitution does not confer entitle- 
ments.85  But  there  is  another  aspect  of  Dandridge  that  deserves 
 
traction of blood from an injured person over his objection did not violate due proc- 
ess). 
82 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 243 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court 
employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become 
an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver. That the motives for doing so are no- 
ble and compassionate does not alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitu- 
tional function to make amends for the defaults of others.”). The issue in Plyler was 
whether a state could withdraw funding reimbursement for the education of children 
of undocumented aliens. Id. at 205. 
83 397 U.S. 471, 474, 487 (1970). 
84 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 755 (citing Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 522 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)). 
85 Id. In this respect, Judge Wilkinson’s critique echoes the views of many conserva- 
tives who see liberalism as an affront to individualism, while believing conservativism 
stands for the principle that “‘government’s principal functions are the preservation of 
freedom and removal of restraints on the individual.’” Id. at 754 (quoting George F. 
Will, Conservative—With Conviction, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1994, at C7). This, of 
course, is presenting conservatism in its most appealing form—that of the defender of 
individualism and freedom. Conservatives, however, seem hopelessly confused on the 
freedom issue. Only three pages after hailing conservatives as the protectors of indi- 
vidual freedom, Judge Wilkinson notes the argument that “in civil rights cases, ‘liberal 
judges generally seek’ to extend individual freedoms, while ‘conservative jurists gen- 
erally prefer to limit such rights.’” Id. at 757 (quoting Robert A. Carp et al., The Vot- 
ing Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 J. Am. Judicature Soc’y 298, 
299 (1993)). The fact is that neither side has a monopoly on championing freedom. 
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mention. The case was equally significant as part of an effort to lay 
the foundation for the argument that laws adversely affecting the 
poor,  as  a  class,  should  merit  heightened  constitutional  scrutiny.86 
Although  the  Court  explicitly  rejected  this  claim  in  a  later  case,87 
the debate over what types of groups merit particular constitu- 
tional solicitude better captures the jurisprudential divide between 
liberals and conservatives than does the issue of whether arguably 
overly sensitive judges should grant relief to particularly sympa- 
thetic  litigants.88  Liberal  jurisprudence,  on  the  one  hand  (as  the 
Dandridge example attests), is concerned with using judicial power 
to protect marginalized groups in society. Conservative jurispru- 
dence, on the other hand (as we shall see), is geared to reinforcing 
the powers of already dominant interests. 
The rationale underlying liberal jurisprudence’s efforts to pro- 
tect marginalized groups is easy to understand. Normally judges 
should defer to the political processes in assessing the merits of 
particular legislation. Occasionally, however, the political processes 
cannot be completely trusted. This is particularly true when legisla- 
tion adversely affects the interests of certain minority groups that 
have traditionally been the target of prejudice and political mis- 
dealing. Legislation that adversely affects such groups, accordingly, 
should be viewed with more exacting judicial scrutiny because the 
possibility of political abuse is manifest. 
The pedigree for this line of thought dates back over sixty years   
to the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,89  and  its  themes  have  been  consistently  developed  since  that 
time—most powerfully by John Hart Ely in his landmark book, 
Democracy and Distrust.90 Consistent with this theory, liberals have 
prevailed in gaining greater judicial scrutiny for legislation ad- 
 
 
86 The intellectual foundation for treating the poor as a suspect class for equal pro- 
tection purposes was set forth by Frank Michelman in his seminal article, Foreword: 
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 
(1969). 
87 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973). 
88 This is, of course, not the only line separating liberal and conservative thought. 
For an excellent and provocative discussion outlining the various differences between 
conservative and liberal jurisprudence, see Robin West, Progressive and Conservative 
Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 641 (1990). 
89 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
90 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). 
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versely   affecting   blacks,91   women,92   aliens   (in   certain   circum- 
stances),93  and  illegitimate  children.94  They  have  attempted  but 
failed to gain such status for the poor,95 the elderly,96 the mentally 
disabled,97 and homosexuals.98 
The case for demanding special constitutional protection for 
many of the groups that have been denied such status is strong, but 
it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  Essay  to  develop  those  arguments.99 
Rather, for purposes of this discussion, it may be conceded that 
liberal attempts to expand the list of groups entitled to special con- 
stitutional solicitude may be criticized on the conservatives’ oft- 
stated grounds that attempting to redress broad social concerns 
should be seen as a matter for the  legislature, not the judiciary.100 
As Judge Wilkinson states, “For the judiciary to assign itself the 
 
 
91 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (strict scrutiny). 
92 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (intermediate scrutiny). 
93 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (strict scrutiny). Strict scrutiny 
does not apply when the discrimination is at the behest of the federal government. 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (using minimal scrutiny to uphold a federal 
law denying Medicare eligibility unless the alien has resided in the United  States for 
five years and has been admitted for permanent residence). The  Court has also  failed  
to apply strict scrutiny to laws relating to the democratic process. See Foley v. Conne- 
lie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (using rational basis review to uphold a citizenship re- 
quirement for becoming a police officer). 
94 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (intermediate scrutiny). 
95 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973). 
96 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976). 
97 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
98 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996). 
99 For a particularly strong argument in favor of recognizing the poor as a suspect 
class, see, for example, Michelman, supra note 86. 
100 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 762. Although deference to the legislature is 
the most commonly stated objection to liberal attempts to expand the list of constitu- 
tionally protected groups, other arguments are also possible. That one may have 
compassion for certain groups, for example, does not necessarily mean that such 
groups should be entitled to special constitutional status. Constitutionally favoring 
one group may lead to increased burdens being placed on less-favored groups. Too 
readily designating groups as meriting strict scrutiny may unnecessarily inhibit impor- 
tant government regulation. Drawing lines between a potentially limitless number of 
claimant groups to whom heightened constitutional protection should be applied and 
those to whom it should not can lead to arbitrary distinctions and undercut the pur- 
poses underlying heightened scrutiny in the first place. Opticians, for example, may be 
a politically vulnerable group, but should laws that discriminate against them be  
viewed under strict scrutiny? See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 
483, 487–88 (1955) (applying minimal scrutiny to a law that treated opticians more 
harshly than optometrists and ophthalmologists). 
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goal of redressing general social inequalities is to set a task so im- 
possibly large that it will come to corrupt what is good and distinc- 
tive in the remedial tasks that law can perform and accomplish.”101 
The problem, however, is that the conservative Justices show lit- 
tle hesitance in doing exactly what they condemn when it serves 
their agenda. They seek favored constitutional status for their own 
chosen constituencies even though they assert that exercising judi- 
cial power to effectuate social policy is illegitimate. They strike 
down, rather than defer to, legislative attempts to alleviate societal 
disparities in wealth and power even though they claim that re- 
dressing social inequities is the province of the legislature. 
The classic example of this behavior is in the affirmative action 
cases. Consider Adarand Constructors v. Pena, the case presenting 
a constitutional challenge to a federal set-aside program benefiting 
minority contractors.102 In that case, the conservative Justices held 
that the challenged program must meet strict scrutiny because it 
discriminated against whites.103 They did so although whites form a 
clear majority of the national electorate and traditionally have not 
been targets of societal discrimination. They did so without support 
in  constitutional  text104  or  in  constitutional  history105  and  with  the 
need to both overrule precedent106 and develop an expansive con- 
cept of plaintiff’s standing in order to achieve their desired result.107 
And they did all of this in disregard of the considered judgment of 
political actors that affirmative action programs were necessary to 
 
 
 
 
101 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 762. 
102 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995). 
103 Id. at 224. 
104 The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal government. But see 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment prohibited the maintenance of racially segregated schools by 
the District of Columbia). 
105 Historical evidence suggests that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not intend to bar affirmative action. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 
Yale L.J. 427, 430–31 (1997); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to 
Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 556 
(1998). 
106 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547 (1990)). 
107 See supra notes 67–79 and accompanying text. 
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assist minorities in achieving economic success and in integrating 
into the larger social power structure.108 
A similar pattern exists with respect to conservative decisions on 
gay rights. Conservative Justices have vehemently and caustically 
criticized the Court’s decisions protecting gays from majoritarian 
action, proclaiming that such protection ignored the moral will of 
the community;109 but when in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale110 the 
time came to determine whether the moral will of a community 
that had decided to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation 
should be enforced against a straight organization claiming it had a 
constitutional right to discriminate, the conservatives sided with 
the “straight” organization—even though it was the “straight” or- 
ganization that was seeking to overturn majoritarian action.111 
Working from the premise that judicial intervention is most war- 
ranted when there are reasons to distrust the political processes, 
these decisions are perverse. White and straight majorities are not 
vulnerable classes:112 Blacks and homosexuals are.113 Yet white and 
straight groups are given judicial relief from laws that were passed 
by polities in which they were the political majority. Meanwhile, 
double burdens are placed on the less politically powerful groups. 
First, they must navigate through difficult political waters in order 
to attract enough members of opposing groups to support their leg- 
islative initiatives. Second, they must face the possibility that a hos- 
tile court will invalidate their legislative victories. 
The conservative Justices’ tendency to protect entrenched inter- 
ests at the expense of marginalized groups is also demonstrated by 
 
 
108 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340–41 (2003) (discussing the policies 
supporting affirmative action). 
109 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
111 Id. at 644. 
112 To be sure, the case for judicial intervention to invalidate an affirmative action 
program is stronger under a “democracy and distrust” approach in a community with 
a majority-minority population than one with a majority-majority population. See 
generally Richmond v. J.A. Crosan Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a minority 
set-aside program in a city with a majority-minority population). 
113 But see Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is . . . nothing short of 
preposterous to call ‘politically unpopular’ a group which enjoys enormous influence   
in American media and politics, and which, . . . though composing no more than 4% 
of the population had the support of 46% of the voters on Amendment 2 . . . .”). 
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their opposition to legislative efforts designed to help level the po- 
litical playing field.114 In First Amendment decisions, for example, 
conservatives have consistently voted to strike down government 
provisions that attempt to weaken the dominance that entrenched 
interests have over public discourse. Thus, in campaign finance 
cases, the conservative Justices have repeatedly opposed efforts 
that would lessen the influence of money in politics. They have in- 
validated limits on independent political party expenditures on be- 
half of political candidates,115 sought to strike down limits on a po- 
litical party’s coordinated expenditures with candidates116 (although 
prevailing on this issue would undermine the Supreme Court deci- 
sion  in  Buckley  v.  Valeo,117  upholding  individual  campaign  contri- 
butions118), and have stated that they would overrule Buckley’s ap- 
proval   of   contribution   limitations   altogether.119   They   recently 
dissented in McConnell v. FEC120 a case that upheld, among other 
campaign reforms, limits on corporate campaign expenditures and, 
in so doing, rejected the majority’s rationale that such limits were 
permissible as justifiable attempts to deal with “‘the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accu- 
mulated  with  the  help  of  the  corporate  form.’”121  In  all  of  these 
cases the effects of the conservatives’ position are the same: The 
powers of the wealthy to participate in and affect political deci- 
 
114 Indeed, in the census case, conservatives went so far as to oppose attempts to as- 
sure that the disaffected individuals would be counted for the purposes of apportion- 
ing political power. See generally Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of Rep- 
resentatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (striking down the use of statistical sampling as a 
method to count the population for purposes of political apportionment). 
115 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 
631 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
116 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
465 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
117 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
118 A donor who had given the maximum amount  to  a  particular  candidate  could 
then simply donate additional monies to the political party, knowing it would be di- 
rected to her chosen candidate’s campaign. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Cam- 
paign Comm., 533 U.S. at 447. 
119 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
120 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
121 Id. at 695 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 
(1990)); see id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 729 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see 
also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 660). Justice Thomas 
was not yet on the Court for the Austin decision. 
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sionmaking  are  protected,122  and  the  ability  of  government  to  ad- 
dress resource-based disparities in the political process is denied. 
Conservative Justices have taken a similarly hard line in address- 
ing the government’s ability to regulate in favor of expanding the 
diversity of voices heard in the media. They dissented in a case that 
upheld an FCC provision requiring cable operators to carry local 
television stations,123 voted to overturn a Court decision upholding 
a  provision  promoting  minority  ownership  of  broadcast  outlets,124 
and have stated that they would invalidate cable access require- 
ments  as  well.125  Their  message  in  these  cases  again  is  clear:  First 
Amendment concerns rest solely with ownership interests. That the 
purpose of the media access requirements is to open up the mar- 
ketplace of ideas to wider debate is of no significance.126 As Justice 
Thomas wrote in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications 
Consortium v. FCC, “[Although a previous decision had indicated 
that] . . . ‘[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right 
of the broadcasters, which is paramount’ . . . that view can no 
longer be given any credence in the cable context. It is the opera- 
tor’s right that is preeminent.”127 
The conservatives’ positions in the campaign finance and media 
access cases could be defended as simply representing a strong 
commitment to First Amendment freedom, but that position is be- 
lied by their positions in other free speech cases. For example, in  
the Denver case, Justice Thomas would have upheld a requirement 
that cable operators block any “indecent” leased access program- 
 
122 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Salant, Analysis: Key House Votes Coincide with Biggest 
Donations, Chi. Trib., July 22, 2003, § 1, at 18 (citing an analysis of campaign finance 
data showing a correlation between interest groups who outspent their opponents and 
success in House of Representatives votes). But see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty As- 
sumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 Yale 
L.J. 1049, 1057–58 (1996) (refuting the assumptions that money buys elections and is a 
“corrupting influence on the legislature”). 
123 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 229 (1997) (O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, 
& Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
124 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547 (1990)). 
125 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 825 
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
126 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1410 
(1986). 
127 518 U.S. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). 
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ming the operator wanted to show even as he was indicating that 
he would strike down cable access requirements.128 Justice Scalia, in 
turn, dissented in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,129 which 
struck down a restriction on anonymous campaign literature distri- 
bution,  a  campaign  tactic  popular  with  marginalized  groups.130 
Meanwhile, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have opposed 
efforts to expand the public forum doctrine, which would allow 
speakers who do not have the resources to gain access to the insti- 
tutional media to more effectively reach listeners and disseminate 
their messages.131 
Nowhere, however, is the conservatives’ penchant for exacerbat- 
ing the disparities between the empowered and disaffected seg- 
ments of society clearer than in judicial access cases. In these cases, 
conservative Justices have routinely resisted judicial and legislative 
attempts to promote the rights and abilities of marginalized liti- 
gants to have access to the courts. The result is that powerful inter- 
ests can violate the rights of the disadvantaged and walk away un- 
scathed, while disadvantaged litigants, who already face resistance 
on the merits of their issues, are denied the opportunity to raise 
their claims in the first place.132 
 
 
128 Id. at 837–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
129 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
130 Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has also shown little deference to 
First Amendment rights in cases involving sexually explicit speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 267 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dis- 
senting); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803,  835 (2000) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Scalia, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). To be  sure,  Justice 
Scalia did take a strong free speech position in voting to strike down laws prohibiting 
flag burning. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
131 See generally  Int’l Soc’y  for Krishna  Consciousness,  Inc.  v.  Lee, 505  U.S.  672 
(1992) (holding an airport terminal not a public forum); United States v. Kokinda, 497 
U.S. 720 (1990) (holding a sidewalk in front of a post office not a public forum). Jus- 
tice Thomas was not yet on the Court for the Kokinda decision. 
132 In this respect, Judge Wilkinson’s insights are again worthwhile. As we have seen, 
his argument is most persuasive in its demonstration of how compassion can often be 
found on both sides of litigation. As he argues, providing relief to the individual liti- 
gant can interfere with the enjoyment of the rights of the collective, and the decision 
as to where most compassion lies can be difficult to ascertain. Of course, in order for 
the compassion that may exist on both sides of a dispute to be weighed and under- 
stood, both sides of a suit must actually be represented. Conservatives apparently fall 
short, however, in recognizing this most obvious of propositions. 
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The conservative record limiting the rights and abilities of disad- 
vantaged litigants to have judicial access is long and consistent. 
Conservatives have turned away low-income litigants challenging 
court costs and other such expenses that prevent indigents from be- 
ing able to litigate their interests. They have stated their intent to 
overturn a forty-year-old precedent and deny indigent criminal de- 
fendants access to trial transcripts necessary to maintain criminal 
appeals.133  They have rejected challenges to legal services funding 
restrictions that would prevent legal assistance lawyers from raising 
challenges  to  welfare  laws  and  other  government  regulations,134 
even if the grounds for those challenges became known during al- 
ready existing representation,135  and even  if  denying  the  ability  of 
the legal services lawyer to bring the challenge would effectively 
prevent the issue  from being litigated.136 They have drastically cut 
back on the rights of prisoners to have access to law libraries and 
other  such  materials  necessary  to  prepare  for  litigation.137  They 
have, as discussed above, placed greater standing barriers on mar- 
ginalized litigants than on members of more powerful interests.138 
Conservative resistance to providing judicial access for the dis- 
advantaged may have reached its zenith this last Term in Brown v. 
Legal Foundation of Washington.139 Brown involved a challenge to 
a program that provided funding for legal services to the poor on 
the grounds that the funding mechanism constituted an unconstitu- 
tional taking.140 The funding program in question, Interest on Law- 
 
 
133 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 139 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)  (stating 
that Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), should be overruled). 
134 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549–50 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent- 
ing). 
135 Id. at 539. 
136 Id. at 547 (“Congress’s . . . restriction operates to insulate current welfare laws 
from constitutional scrutiny and certain other legal challenges . . . .”). To this point, 
Justice Scalia responded simply, “So what?” Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
137 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (limiting the right of prisoner 
access to legal materials recognized in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)). 
138 See supra notes 67–79 and accompanying text. A particularly dramatic example 
of the barriers that the conservatives have erected in the way of standing may be  
found in Lewis, 518 U.S. at 343. In that case the conservatives held that in order for a 
prisoner to be able to challenge a provision restricting his access to legal materials to 
assist in his appeal, he would have to show that his appeal would have been successful 
if he were allowed such access. Id. at 349–59. 
139 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003). 
140 See id. at 1411. 
2004] Empty Promise 381 
yers’ Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”) used interest on lawyers’ trust 
accounts to pay for legal services for the needy. The program oper- 
ated by mandating that attorneys holding client funds pool those 
funds in interest bearing bank accounts. The interest earned from 
those accounts was then used to fund organizations that provide 
legal services. Importantly, only client funds that could not earn in- 
terest for their owner could be used in the pooled accounts,141 and, 
for this reason, proponents of the IOLTA plans believed the pro- 
grams ingenious because money for legal services could be gener- 
ated presumably without cost or harm to the clients whose funds 
served as principal. Nevertheless, litigants who opposed legal ser- 
vices funding challenged IOLTA programs on grounds that they 
were unconstitutional takings.142 
After an earlier case held that the interest earned on client funds 
in IOLTA accounts was the private property of the client for Tak- 
ings  Clause  purposes,143  the  question  in  Brown  was  whether  that 
taking  was  unconstitutional  for  lack  of  just  compensation.144  The 
majority held that no compensation was required because the cli- 
ent  suffered  no  pecuniary  loss.145  The  fact  that  the  affected  client 
funds could not earn interest income meant that no compensation 
was required. 
The conservative Justices dissented.146 To the conservatives, the 
result in the case was no less than judicially endorsed class warfare. 
In the words of Justice Scalia: 
Perhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole 
new concept in Compensation Clause jurisprudence: the Robin 
Hood Taking, in which the government’s extraction of wealth 
from those who own it is so cleverly achieved, and the object of 
the government’s larcenous beneficence is so highly favored by 
 
141 Such funds would include those of insubstantial amounts, those held for short pe- 
riods of time, or other such funds for which the costs of administering the account 
would exceed any interest earned by the client. See id. at 1413. 
142 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 
2001) (challenging the Washington State IOLTA program). 
143 Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998). 
144 The Court also discussed whether devoting the funds to legal services constituted    
a public use, although that issue had apparently not been raised below. See Brown,  
123 S. Ct. at 1422 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
145 See id. at 1419–21. 
146 Id. at 1422 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
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the courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent defendants) 
that the normal rules of the Constitution protecting private prop- 
erty are suspended. One must hope that that is the case. For to 
extend to the entire run of Compensation Clause cases the ra- 
tionale supporting today’s judgment—what the government hath 
given, the government may freely take away—would be disas- 
trous.147 
Apparently not wanting to be associated with the likes of Robin 
Hood, the conservatives decided that it would be better to void the 
program even though the plaintiffs had suffered no monetary 
harm148—even if invalidating the IOLTA program would seriously 
threaten  the  continued  viability  of  legal  services  programs.149  For 
the conservatives, just compensation was to be determined by the 
fair market value of the property and not the net loss to the plain- 
tiffs (zero). The fact that the property had, or could have, no value 
outside the IOLTA program was irrelevant to the dissenters.150 
Undoubtedly, the takings issue in Brown was difficult. One 
would think, however, that if conservatism were truly compassion- 
ate, the dissenters would have joined the majority. To begin with, 
the conservatives in Brown could not rely on their old argument of 
deferring to state political judgments—IOLTA programs had been 
 
 
 
 
147 Id. at 1428 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148 The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief to void the program rather than mone- 
tary relief for themselves on grounds that recovering “small amounts” through litiga- 
tion would be impractical. Id. at 1417. 
149 See generally Katharine L. Smith, IOLTA in the Balance: The Battle of Legality 
and Morality Between Robin Hood and the Miser, 34 St. Mary’s L.J. 969, 981–82 
(2003) (describing the importance of IOLTA funds to civil legal services). Had the 
conservatives succeeded, the viability of legal services organizations, already hard hit 
by federal funding cuts, would have been further threatened. IOLTA programs, 
which generated over $200 million in 2001, are the second largest source of funding 
for civil legal services. Id. The largest source is the federally funded Legal Services 
Corporation (“LSC”), with a 2001 budget of $330 million. David Luban, Taking Out 
the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 
209, 211 n.5 (2003). The dependence of legal services programs on IOLTA proceeds, 
moreover, is likely to increase due to a recent reduction in LSC providers and a shift 
toward state-based funding. See Smith, supra, at 981–82. 
150 See Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1424 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The conclusion that [the 
property] is devoid of value because of the circumstances giving rise to its creation is 
indefensible.”). 
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enacted in all fifty states.151 Nor could the conservatives claim it was 
outside their province to redress social inequities by promoting le- 
gal services for the needy because, in this case, they were only be- 
ing asked to defend such a program, not proactively create one.152 
There was also, to use Judge Wilkinson’s formulation, no case to 
be made that compassion existed on both sides of the litigation. 
The plaintiffs’ financial losses were so insignificant that they ar- 
gued they should be granted injunctive relief voiding the program 
rather than money damages because the amounts sought for com- 
pensation were so small as to “render recovery through litigation 
impractical.”153  (The  suit  was  apparently  more  an  effort  to  curtail 
the funding of the legal services program than it was an attempt to 
make the plaintiffs whole.154) On the other side, funding a program 
designed to promote judicial access for those who cannot afford 
representation should be seen as central to the interests of justice. 
Over 125 years ago in Windsor v. McVeigh, the Court described the 
right to be heard as lying “at the foundation of all well-ordered sys- 
tems   of   jurisprudence.”155   Contemporary   conservative   jurispru- 
dence as evidenced in Brown and the other judicial access cases 
apparently does not recognize even this most basic principle. 
Nevertheless, the conservatives’ judicial access decisions are 
consistent with the broader conservative pattern that we have seen 
so far. Conservative sympathies rest with the established and not 
the disaffected. Even with respect to matters involving access to 
justice, the one area where all members of the legal community 
 
 
151 All fifty states and the District of Columbia have  adopted IOLTA  programs  to  
pay for legal services for the poor. Id. at 1411. Five IOLTA programs were enacted by 
state legislatures; the rest were adopted by rules of the highest court in the state. Id. at 
1411 n.2. 
152 Indeed, if compassionate jurisprudence meant anything, it should have led the 
conservatives to uphold the IOLTA program precisely because the takings issue in 
Brown was difficult and novel. Compassionate conservative jurisprudence, we are 
told, does not require that judges “exclude compassion from their decisions” when the 
law is not clear. See Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 761. 
153 Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1417. 
154 The attack on legal services funding mounted in Brown was not, as Professor 
Deborah Weissman shows, anomalous. In fact, legal services funding has been under 
siege from conservative forces in virtually all quarters. See Deborah M. Weissman, 
Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 737, 
757–85 (2002). 
155 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876). 
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should unite, the conservatives do not acknowledge the value of 
broadening the class of persons able to gain access to justice. In his 
essay, Judge Wilkinson writes, “no amount of other virtues could 
ultimately compensate for a jurisprudence that was not, in the end, 
humanely  grounded.”156  The  conservatives’  vigilant  opposition  to 
judicial access for the disadvantaged does not fare well through this 
lens. 
 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of his essay, Judge Wilkinson argues that we should 
work to minimize the polarization that currently exists in the legal 
culture.157 The point is well taken. On the one hand, political civility 
is undermined when one reflexively brands one’s opponents, and 
mutual understanding is not promoted when the primary criticism 
of one’s opponents is reduced to labels.158 On the other hand, posi- 
tively describing one’s own ideology as virtuous does not make it 
so. 
Such is the case with Judge Wilkinson’s assertion that conserva- 
tive jurisprudence is compassionate. Certainly, the argument can 
be made that compassion is not fostered when courts react more to 
the plight of sympathetic litigants than to rules of law. It may also 
be fairly asserted that in order to foster compassion, the individual- 
ized concerns present in collective interests must be recognized 
 
 
156 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 770. I suspect that some might argue that conservative 
jurisprudence is “humanely grounded” because, by protecting the prerogative of en- 
trenched interests, it serves to maximize the overall wealth in society, benefitting both 
the advantaged and the disadvantaged. See e.g. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the 
Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947, 977–78 (1984). But while this argument may 
offer some defense to the conservatives' property and economic rights decisions (al- 
though even then it could be labeled as no more than a notion of “trickle-down jus- 
tice”), it has little application to the antidiscrimination and access to justice cases. For 
example, although limiting the ability of the disadvantaged to gain access to the courts 
might help in achieving judicial efficiency and in reducing transaction costs generally, 
there is little claim that such action is jurisprudentially humane. After all, as Judge 
Posner reminds us, “there is more to justice than economics.” Richard A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law 28 (6th ed. 2003). 
157 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 770–71. 
158 Of course, dissenting opinions that accuse the Court majority of  falling victim to 
the homosexual agenda, see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2474, 2496 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting), or acting like Robin Hood, see Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1428 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), are also not helpful in this respect. 
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along with the particular interests of individual litigants. Judge 
Wilkinson makes both arguments effectively. But the conservatism 
he describes is not that of the conservative wing of the Supreme 
Court. Contemporary conservative jurisprudence does not shy 
away from using sympathy toward its preferred constituencies in 
reaching judicial decisions, and it is not afraid to reject collective 
concerns that oppose those interests when it deems it appropriate. 
More significantly, contemporary conservative jurisprudence is not 
reluctant to use its power to reinforce the prerogatives of en- 
trenched interests even as it condemns the use of judicial power to 
protect the interests of marginalized groups. To describe such a ju- 
risprudence as compassionate is to remove all content from the 
meaning of the word. 
